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CORRESPONDENCE 
JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
To the Editors: 
In the April 1979 issue of the Michigan Law Review, Professor Ira 
Lupu added his valuable contribution to the continuing debate on 
the problem of defining the nature of fundamental rights under the 
Constitution.1 In many respects his article is a wholly admirable 
piece of scholarship, both well-researched and carefully reasoned. 
However, on one issue - the question of judicial competence to 
identify the values he defines as fundamental - Professor Lupu's 
discussion is seriously deficient. This letter will examine the prob-
lem of judicial competence and conclude that it is fatal to Professor 
Lupu's conception of the appropriate role of the Court under the due 
process and equal protection clauses. 
In his search for a source of fundamental rights, Professor Lupu 
identifies two criteria which he finds that a given claim must satisfy 
to deserve special protection under the Constitution: 
1) Historically, American institutions must have recognized the lib-
erty claim as one of paramount stature. 
2) Contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a level of 
high priority.2 
Accepting arguendo the basic premise that one should look 
outside the history and text of the Constitution to find fundamental 
rights,3 this definition of such rights seems at least as appropriate as 
any other. But having identified the criteria that determine funda-
mentality, one must still determine whether the Court is institution-
1. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 MICH. L. Rev. 981 
(1979) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Lupu]. 
2. Id. at 1040-41. 
3. Little needs to. be added to the discussion in the article of the various positions on this 
point. See id. at 1034-35. One's position depends largely on a kind of existential leap of faith 
made from very basic premises concerning the appropriate role of the courts in shaping values 
in American society. In the interests offull disclosure, I would only add that my personal leap 
brings me to the side of Black (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (196S) (Black, J., 
dissenting), Berger (R. BEROER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977)), and Bork (Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND, L.J. 1 (1971)), rather than Harlan 
(Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-S02 (196S) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment)), Perry (Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals and the Police Power: The Eth/cal Function of 
Substantive J)ue Process, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 689 (1976)), and Lupu. 
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ally competent to identify the values that satisfy these criteria.4 
Institutional competence in this sense is a relative rather than an ab-
solute concept; the issue is not whether the Court will invariably dis-
tinguish correctly between fundamental and nonfundamental 
liberties but rather whether entrusting such decisions to the Court 
will result in a more accurate determination than leaving the matter 
entirely to the political branches. 5 
The clearest example of the problem with the Lupu approach 
comes in the determination of contemporary values. Since the val-
ues of a nation are in fact values of the people of that nation, it is 
tempting to conclude that because legislators must return to the peo-
ple periodically to be elected, their sense of national values will be 
more acccurate than similar determinations by juJges who are ap-
pointed for life. 6 Lupu attempts to avoid this problem by drawing a 
distinction between national majorities on the one hand and state 
and local majorities on the other. He argues that state legislative 
decisions are likely to reflect local values, which may vary from 
those of the nation as a whole. It is these national values which the 
Constitution embodies. Since the Supreme Court is a national body, 
he concludes that it is at least as competent as local legislatures to 
divine these national values.7 
Professor Lupu would have the Court accomplish this task 
largely by considering widespread patterns of state legislation. 8 
Such an approach would work a rather bizarre alteration in the 
structure of American federalism. As generally conceived, subject to 
limitations imposed by the national government, any given state 
government (or group of state governments) has no authority to af-
4. See Lupu at 1049. 
5. In fairness it must be noted that an erroneous determination that courts rather than 
legislatures are more· institutionally competent to identify fundamental rights has different 
consequences than a similarly inaccurate appraisal that the legislature is the more able of the 
two bodies to make such decisions. In the former case, rights that are not fundamental will be 
added to those values that the legislature has already accurately detenniJ)ed to satisfy Lupu's 
criteria; the result will be that the legislature will be denied the flexibility to act in some areas 
where its authority should be paramount. In the latter situation, individuals will be denied 
some liberties which should be considered fundamental. 
One could plausibly argue that preventing infringements on fundamental liberties is some-
how more important than preserving legislative flexibility in those areas where it is appropri-
ately exercised. This argument leads to the conclusion that one should prefer judicial to 
legislative identification of fundamental values if there is any doubt regarding relative institu-
tional competence. My only response is that I disagree with the major premise of the argu-
ment. 
6. Lupu at 1049 (citing Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Foreword· On .Discovering 
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 49-50 (1978)). 
7. See Lupu at 1049. See also id. at 1042-43. 
8. But see id. at 1049. 
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feet the policies of any other state government. Thus, for example if 
all states except Minnesota believed that the use of marijuana should 
be legalized, Minnesota is under no compulsion to follow that judg-
ment if its legislators do not agree with it. 
But under the Lupu scenario, if a sufficient number of states were 
to adopt a policy and maintain it over a long period of time, they 
could in effect use the institution of the Supreme Court to force this 
policy on other unwilling states. His own example of no-fault di-
vorce laws provides an excellent illustration. If all states but Michi-
gan chose to adopt such laws, and maintained them over a 
sufficiently long period of time to constitute "historical" recognition, 
then Michigan in effect would be forced by the other states to adopt 
such an approach, even if the Michigan legislature has repeatedly 
considered and rejected the no-fault proposal. 
But Professor Lupu's argument also suffers from a more basic 
:flaw: it discounts the position of Congress in making the value judg-
ments that he would give the Court the power to override. The argu-
ment that the Supreme Court is in a better position than state and 
local governmental bodies to ascertain national values has some 
appeal; however, the argument falters when an attempt is made to 
apply it to congressional judgments. Like state legislators, represen-
tatives and senators are elected, and thus their votes presumably re-
flect the values of their constituents; and almost by definition, the 
constituency of Congress reflects a cross section of national opinion. 
The existence of Congress is important in two respects. First, 
while most cases decided under equal protection and substantive due 
process rationales have concerned state laws, the same standards ap-
ply to the actions by the federal government. For example, although 
Maher v. Roe9 dealt with the constitutionality of a state's refusal to 
fund nontherapeutic abortions as general medical aid, the same prin-
ciples would apply to federal laws that similarly limit funding. 10 I 
do not understand Professor Lupu to argue that substantive due 
process applies different constraints to the stat~s than to the federal 
government; indeed, given the identical wording of the due process 
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, such a contention 
would be extraordinarily difficult for anyone to maintain. Nor does 
he seem uncomfortable with the concept that the fifth amendment 
incorporates standards generally equivalent to those of the equal 
protection clause.11 Yet the arguments he uses for preferring the 
9. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See Lupu at 1003-15. 
10. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977). 
11. See Lupu at 995 & n.78. 
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judgment of the Court over those of state and local governments on 
issues of fundamental rights are simply inapplicable when applied to 
Congress. 
Of course, in most situations where a state law is challenged as 
abridging a fundamental right, there will be no congressional action 
directly suggesting a position on the issue. Professor Lupu argues 
that in such cases the Court can make an independent decision on 
the ground that Congress has "refuse[ d] to accept the assignment" of 
defining fundamental rights.12 But the very fact of congressional in-
action suggests a decision that the challenged state law does not in-
trude on fundamental rights. If Congress had felt that such an 
intrusion had taken place, it could have enacted a statute invalidat-
ing the state law and made its decision stick under the supremacy 
clause. Nor can the failure to adopt such a law be attributed to inad-
vertence; generally, if the challenged state law touches the kind of 
deeply felt values that Lupu defines as "fundamental," then one can 
expect some constituents to bring the matter to the attention of their 
representatives. Given this situation, one can only take congres-
sional inaction as approval of, or at least acquiescence in, the policy 
underlying the state law.13 
Thus, if the Lupu position is to be adequately justified, it cannot 
rest on the theory that it is transferring final authority on national 
values from local governments to the national government ( embod-
ied by the Supreme Court); rather, it must justify transferring final 
authority from the political branches of the federal government to 
the judicial arm of the government. This in turn requires a demon-
stration that Congress is often likely to ignore the deeply held values 
to which Lupu refers in determining what actions it is to take. 
In another context, Professor Lupu suggests that he would adopt 
12. Id. at 1049. 
13. Although Professor Lupu does not seriously argue that Congress will often not be em-
powered to override state judgments in matters touching fundamental rights, see Lupu at 1049 
n.323, the matter deserves some mention. At least in theory, the federal government is one of 
only enumerated powers, most of which are listed in U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. These powers 
have, however, been interpreted quite broadly, particularly the commerce power and the tax-
ing and spending authority to which Lupu himself refers. Indeed, the interpretation of these 
powers has been so broad as to lead some commentators to suggest that the theory of enumer-
ated powers is no longer any constraint on Congress at all. E.g., E. BARRETT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW- CASES AND MATERIALS 248-49 {5th ed. 1977). 
In any event, if, as Lupu argues, the fourteenth amendment embodies a judgment that 
rights meeting his criteria merit special protection, then Congress has authority to protect those 
rights independent of the powers enumerated in article I. Section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment gives Congress the authority to enforce the provisions of the amendment, and this power 
is broad enough to allow Congress to protect those values that are fundamental within the 
meaning of the due process clause. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); United 
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). · 
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Professor Perry's position that the nature of the federal legislative 
process makes its actions inherently unreliable as a barometer of so-
cial attitudes that help determine which rights are fundamental. 14 In 
support of this contention, Lupu offers three possibilities, which are 
best discussed in the context of a particular right. Consider the situa-
tion in which a majority has come to the conclusion that the liberty 
to choose one's sexual preference is one to be "valued . . . at a high 
priority" and thus that all laws discriminating against homosexuals 
should be abandoned. Lupu first argues that the majority may fail to 
obtain revisions of laws prohibiting such conduct because they may 
be laboring under the misconception that most people still believe 
that the homosexual conduct should be forbidden. Fearing defeat, 
the members of the majority may shift their energies to other 
projects that they perceive to have better prospects.15 
Second, Lupu suggests that the law might not be changed be-
cause of a lack of forceful commitment on the part of the majority. 
He and Perry reason that since most members of the majority will 
have no personal stake in the removal of sanctions against homosex-
uals, they will not be inclined to pursue this goal aggressively. Thus, 
their will can be defeated by a small but vocal minority favoring the 
retention of such sanctions.16 
Finally, the possibility is raised that the majority may be lulled 
into a false sense of security by a long-term failure to enforce the 
offending sanctions. Since a ban on homosexual acts will not seem 
to have any immediate effect on any person, opponents of the law 
may feel that their efforts are more profitably invested in seeking 
other changes. Thus, when a change in policy in the prosecutor's 
office leads to a decision to prosecute homosexual behavior, people 
may be arrested and convicted under a law that offends the sensibili-
ties of the majority.17 
The first two arguments would have greater force if Lupu's con-
cept of a fundamental right embraced all attitudes of the majority of 
society which have been held for the requisite amount of time to 
become historically established. But as he recognizes, this would 
give the due process clause far too great a scope. Instead, he limits 
the concept to those rights to which members of society give a high 
priority. Beliefs in such rights are likely to be deeply held; thus, 
those holding the beliefs will be unlikely to be deterred from press-
14. Lupu at 1039 & n.286 (citing Perry, supra note 3, at 727-28). 
15. Lupu at 1039 n.286. 
16. Id. at 1039-40 & n.286; Perry, supra note 3, at 727-28. 
17. Lupu at 1039 n.286. 
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ing their position by the perception that they constitute a minority 
view. Similarly, high priority values are almost by definition those 
which a person will actively and vocally support. If freedom of sex-
ual preference is in that category, then rather than facing a basically 
indifferent majority which generally favors such freedom and a 
strongly committed active minority which favors criminal sanctions 
for homosexual activity, the legislature will likely be faced with two 
vocal groups-a majority pressing for repeal of sanctions and a mi-
nority for retaining ( or even strengthening) the current laws. Given 
that scenario, repeal seems almost inevitable. 
The argument based on the possibility of a return to enforcement 
after a long period of nonenforcement is more troubling. Griswold v. 
Connecticut18 stands as an apparent example of just such an occur-
rence. But even without invoking the specter of substantive due 
process analysis, the system presently offers potential correctives; the 
possibility of jury nullification and the use of executive clemency 
come to mind immediately. Moreover, such instances are likely to 
be isolated, and the damage to deeply held values self-limiting; any 
attempt to part from past policy and enforce on a significant scale a 
statute that is antithetical to widely and deeply held values will al-
most certainly be met by public resistance and a quick repeal of the 
offending law. In short, the magnitude of the danger does not seem 
sufficient to justify the Court's arrogation of such a broad and poten-
tially dangerous power as the authority to define fundamental rights 
based on its perception of society's past and current ethical values. 
Professor Lupu fails to mention what is perhaps the greatest 
practical barrier to a pure majoritarian implementation of values 
through the federal legislature - the existence of the Senate. One 
can readily envision a situation in which the House of Representa-
tives passed a bill guaranteeing the rights of homosexuals, while the 
Senate rejected a similar bill even though members of each house of 
Congress faithfully followed the wishes of their respective constitu-
encies. In such a case, the vote of the House would reflect majority 
sentiment, yet discrimination against homosexuals would remain le-
gal. 
At the outset, it seems appropriate to note the apparent incon-
gruity of employing the due process clause as a counterweight to that 
pernicious anti-majoritarian institution, the United States Senate. 
But even leaving this incongruity aside, the existence and composi-
tion of the Senate does not significantly detract from the efficacy of 
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Congress as an instrument for ascertaining and protecting funda-
mental values. For certainly such values, no matter how deeply and 
long-lastingly held, must be shared by more than a bare majority in 
order to rise to the level envisioned by Professor Lupu under the due 
process clause. What is needed is a consensus, rather than a simple 
majority view; and in a nation as diverse as the United States, it 
seems only appropriate that the consensus cross regional lines. To 
decide otherwise would tum the due process clause into a device by 
which, for example, the populous East could impose its deeply held 
beliefs on the sparsely populated states. Given this observation, the 
make-up of the Senate should not be seen as a barrier to reliance on 
the legislative judgment for determining which rights are fundamen-
tal. . 
In short, one would expect that in general ( although admittedly 
not always) the federal legislature would act to protect those rights 
which are fundamental within Professor Lupu's definition. By con-
trast, the ability of the Court to identify such values accurately is far 
more questionable. Plainly the Justices are not exposed to the kind 
of input on moral values that is available to legislators through the 
day-to-day operation of the political process. And the principal sur-
rogate that Professor Lupu suggests - observation of the actions 
taken by state and federal legislators19 - is likely to be misleading. 
It is no doubt true that one can expect fundamental rights to be 
widely protected by Congress and state legislators, but it does not 
necessarily follow that all rights which receive such protection are 
fundamental. A general pattern of protection for a given interest 
may simply reflect a weak but widespread preference for a given pol-
icy judgment rather than a high priority value of the sort envisioned 
by Professor Lupu. 
Moreover, if the Court errs, correction will be more difficult than 
if the legislature had made an analogous error. Unlike a legislature, 
the judiciary is bound by the principle of stare decisis. Although 
applied somewhat less rigidly in constitutional litigation,20 this con-
cept remains an impediment to adjustments of constitutional rules 
by the courts in the face of changing conditions. Perhaps more im-
portantly, while legislatures may continually reexamine their conclu-
sions on their own initiative, courts may only decide issues presented 
to them in an adversary posture. This factor takes on particular im-
portance where a state law is held unconstitutional and then 
19. See Lupu at 1048. 
20. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (Harlan, J.); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). 
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amended to meet the Court's objection; in such a situation, the dec-
laration of unconstitutionality cannot be reconsidered. Legislators 
may feel that their institutional duty requires them to respect judicial 
determinations of unconstitutionality whatever their view of appro-
priate policy might be. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself, in Cooper 
v. Aaron,21 has suggested that legislators have such a duty.22 
In summation, not only is the legislature better placed than the 
Court to identify fundamental values accurately , but an error made 
in this regard by the legislature is more easily corrected than a simi-
lar mistake by the Court. Thus, the Court should refrain from at-
tempting to make such determinations. 
Professor Lupu's article is a valiant effort to supply an appropri-
ate theoretical basis for a relatively expansive role for the Court in 
de.fining fundamental rights. His attempt ultimately fails, however, 
because he undervalues the role of Congress in the recognition and 
enforcement of such rights. There still remains to be constructed a 
satisfactory framework to guide the Court's search for a role in pro-
tecting liberties outside of those which find support in constitutional 
text or history. 
Reply: 
Earl M. Maltz 
AssfrtantProjessorofLaw 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
I thank Professor Maltz for his generally kind characterization of 
my work. More importantly, I thank him for provoking me to am-
plify a point on which I spent only one short paragraph and one 
footnote in Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 
On "the question of judicial competence to identify the values [to be 
defined] as fundamental,"2 Professor Maltz has convinced me that 
my initial discussion, while not "seriously deficient," does need fur-
ther development. 
I've taken more than my fair share of pages in this Review, so I 
shall be as brief as possible in responding to Professor Maltz: 
21. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
22. See 358 U.S. at 18. 
1. 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Strands-]. The 
paragraph and footnote to which I refer is at 1049 and n.323. 
2. Maltz, Judicial Competence and Fundamental Rights, 18 MICH. L. REV. 284 (1979). 
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1. The "tails wag the other tails" argument. Professor Maltz sug-
gests that my view would permit a majority of states to "gang up" on 
a few others who refuse to fall in line on a matter of legislative pol-
icy.3 If any scenario is bizarre, it is his. Why would the other forty-
nine states care if Michigan varied on divorce policy? Presumably, 
some Michigan plaintiffs would care; otherwise, no lawsuit would 
come about. I argued in Strands that "[a] widespread pattern of 
state legislation in support of the liberty is also relevant"4 on the 
contemporary values question. That is hardly a suggestion that a 
fundamental value .finding is automatically triggered when a critical 
mass of state legislation accumulates. These are questions of subtle 
and difficult judgment, and state law patterns are only one element 
in the decisional process. (Yes, Louisiana, you may keep your 
Francophiliac legal quirks.) . 
2. The "Congress as a source of fundamental values" argument. 
My discount of Congress's judgment on fundamental values, says 
Professor Maltz, is a "more basic :flaw"5 in my argument. Although 
it strikes me as :flawless to do so, I concede that the Court should be 
more deferential to congressional action which intrudes upon argua-
bly fundamental values than it might be if a state legislature acted 
similarly. The deference difference is not a product of divergent 
constitutional standards; rather, it is a product of more judicial re-
spect for Congress on the matter of national values than would be 
due a state legislature. The standards are the same; congressional 
responses are simply worth more, given the character of the stan-
dards as rooted in values embedded nationwide. 
Professor Maltz and I quite clearly part company, however, when 
he suggests that congressional inaction can reasonably be construed 
as a national legislative judgment that a particular state law does not 
intrude on fundamental rights.6 At first glance, Professor Maltz's ar-
gument seems outrageously misguided; the dangers of drawing infer-
ences of legislative approval from legislative silence are significant 
and well known. In light of all the impediments to .final legislative 
action - bills must be introduced, survive committees,7 compete 
3. Id. at 286. 
4. Strands at 1048. 
5. Maltz, supra note 2, at 286. 
6. Id. at 287. 
7. Professor Maltz's worry about the Senate's anti-majoritarianism, id. at 289-90, seems 
sickly-pale when compared with the anti-majoritarianism of the congressional committee sys-
tem. Senator Russell Long, for example, in all his accumulated power as Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee, can almost singlehandedly block (though he cannot singlehand-
edly enact) tax or welfare legislation. Is Senator Long's opposition to a bill to be viewed as 
functionally equivalent to national legislative disapproval of its policies? 
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with others for legislative priority, etc. - inaction is never a safe 
source for even the most uncontroversial of inferences (e.g., legisla-
tive acquiescence in some innocuous administrative policy). The po-
litical sensitivity of most fundamental rights issues renders any such 
inferences from silence wholly inappropriate; on such issues, legisla-
tors sense that any position will make some constituents very upset, 
and lawmakers consequently avoid taking a stand. Such a process 
cannot responsibly be viewed as deliberate, democratic decision 
about the scope of fundamental rights. Indeed, it would be sounder 
to treat denials of certiorari as affirmances on the merits, and we 
know better than to do that. 
Second, Professor Maltz assumes dangerously much about the 
scope of congressional power to act on all these questions. True, 
once "deeply embedded values" are embraced by section 1 of the 
fourteenth amendment, Congress would seem to have power, con-
ferred by section 5, to discover such values and protect them against 
state infringement. Moreover, I suggested in Strands that the histori-
cal component of the test for such values is a necessary check against 
judicial mistake;8 when Congress is acting, perhaps only contempo-
rary support (i.e., enough to legislate) is required. That view, how-
ever, leads to the conclusion that Congress may displace any state 
law on any subject simply by asserting that the override is in service 
of fundamental rights. Such a conclusion obliterates even the theo-
retical notion of a national government of delegated powers only. 
Furthermore, that view of section 5 power offers no principled way 
to block congressional efforts to reverse the Court's view of funda-
mental values, and thus imperils the Marbury9 notion that the Court 
is the final arbiter of constitutional questions. Total deference to 
congressional judgment and power on these questions, therefore, 
threatens qoth federalism and separation of powers structures.10 My 
own view of section 5 power is thus a more limited one; Congress 
may act to further (but not retard) the Court's section 1 concerns and 
even then is entitled to deference only when its judgment is pre-
sumptively more expert than the Court's. Given a restrained search 
for values truly embedded, rather than momentarily popular, neither 
the power nor the expertise of Congress should be thought as sweep-
ing as Professor Maltz would have it. I conceded above a "deference 
difference," but that in no way implies a license to Congress to usurp 
8. Strands at 1040-46. 
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
10. For the most recent set of judicial views on these complex and controversial questions, 
see the range of opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
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the Court's position as ultimate guardian of constitutional values. 
Just as the Court is perceived as being on dangerous ground when it 
"legislates" in too much detail, so too is the power separation fabric 
stretched thin when Congress undertakes a judicial role. 11 Professor 
Maltz's position is thus doubly faulted; it draws inappropriate infer-
ences from silence, and does so in situations where Congress's power 
to be vocal is very much, and very properly, in doubt. 
Professor Maltz seems to recognize the weakness of his "inaction 
plus power to act equals approval" line of argument, and so he shifts 
subtly to a somewhat different approach. He contends, in essence, 
that a market test for "deeply embedded values" is the only appro-
priate one. If intense individual value preferences exist, he asserts, 
they will rise to public notice, ultimately aggregate, and finally be-
come translated into legislation. When that does not occur, he be-
lieves, the values are not held with sufficient depth or intensity, and 
so should not be protected judicially under my standards. Finally, 
even if this process is short-circuited by lax enforcement of a law that 
offends such values, Professor Maltz contends that ad hoc devices 
(jury nullification or executive clemency) will limit the damage. 
On the last point first, I can only say that reliance on such devices 
seems a horribly insecure and unreliable way to protect rights. 
Moreover, to return to the issue of local vs. national standards, those 
devices won't help much if a wide majority in one state has tempor-
arily been swept up in some berserk passion. On the more funda-
mental conception of the political arena as market, I think that 
Professor Maltz has embraced a model of classical democracy, 12 and 
that such a model is at powerful odds with current political reality. 
We have no national town meetings, or binding national value pref-
erence polls. Most citizens have no regular access to their represen-
tatives, either state or federal. Elections, modem political science 
has suggested, are not mechanisms by which popular views on policy 
11. A useful, though imperfect, analogy can be drawn between the problem discussed in 
the text and the problem of judicial invalidation of state law as inconsistent with the unexer-
cised federal commerce power. Although, in that setting, Congress clearly has final authority 
to "prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed," Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) I, 9 (1824) (and thus to consent to or override state law impediments to interstate 
commerce), the Court has frequently filled in congressional silence with a negative on the 
challenged state law. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). It 
does so, moreover, in a context in which the relevant fact-finding seems peculiarly "legislative" 
in character. 
12. For an illuminating review and critique of the vast literature on democratic theory, see 
J. LIVELY, DEMOCRACY 52-110 (1975). My argument above and in Strands tends to follow the 
descriptive conclusions of the emp_irical theorists. See id. at 60-76. For a critique, on norma-
tive grounds, of the elitist qualities of empirical theory, see id. at 76-80 and the sources cited at 
78 n.17. 
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are mandated; rather, they are devices to check abuse by government 
insiders and to allow for orderly power transitions. Professor Maltz's 
argument13 that deeply held value preferences will inevitably find 
legislative protection assumes a degree and quality of participatory 
democracy that we do not have and, in a mass society, we are not 
likely ever to have. 
High priority values, in my view, are not necessarily those which 
lead individuals or organized groups into the political arena. 
Rather, such values are cultural norms that undergird the ongoing 
social arrangement. Legislative politics is rarely concerned with dis-
covery of such basics; it tends to exalt exp'ediency over principle, and 
distributional questions over moral ones. Judicial attention to basic 
values thus becomes a necessary check on the occasional tendency of 
political branches to respond to more immediate, shortsighted con-
cerns at the expense of deeper, though perhaps less consciously em-
braced, social values. Litigation efforts (mounted, presumably, by 
those whose interests are immediately affected) are thus a better test 
of intensity (though not frequency) of basic value preferences than is 
legislative output, and are certainly a better test than legislative si-
lence. 
Finally, Professor Maltz tells us that "the ability of the Court to 
identify [fundamental] values accurately is far more questionable 
[than the ability of Congress]"14 and that "the Justices are not ex-
posed to the kind of input on moral values that is available to legisla-
tors through the day-to-day operation of the political process."15 On 
the latter point, an empirical one, I have indicated above my con-
trary guess. Legislators are exposed to policy choices and pressures, 
and those pressures may easily overwhelm any moral value compo-
nent in the choices faced. If we consider the kind of input as well as 
the frequency or accuracy of input, I find it difficult to accept the 
proposition that legislators generally receive, much less respond to, 
anything resembling pure assertions of fundamental values. The 
Court is far more likely to be exposed, on a regular basis, to the 
broad range of moral aspirations toward which the society endeav-
ors, and the Court is far more likely to possess the detachment re-
quired to reconcile immediate needs with those aspirations. On this 
matter, perhaps Professor Maltz is right when he says, in a slightly 
different context, that one's conclusions "depend largely on a kind of 
13. Maltz, supra note 2, at 287. See, e.g., J. A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 269-83 (1943). 
14. Maltz, supra note 2, at 290. 
15. Id. 
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existential leap of faith made from very basic premises concerning 
the appropriate role of courts in shaping values in American soci-
ety."16 My own leap of faith extends to process as well as to sub-
stance, and I remain hopeful that the judicial process can 
competently and wisely discharge the task I would assign it. 
16. Id. at 284 n.3. 
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